Motorhome security in France: how thieves operate and which security measures really help

France is one of the most important travel and transit countries for motorhome users. At the same time, reports of stolen campervans and motorhomes are causing concern. One claim currently repeated particularly often is that the theft risk for leisure vehicles has risen by 30 percent within a year.

This figure comes from the “Observatoire des vols et de la récupération après-vol 2026” published by French tracking provider Coyote Secure. Coyote reports a 30 percent increase in the observed theft risk for vans and camping-cars compared with the previous year. However, the analysis is based on the vehicle population monitored by Coyote and is not a complete official statistic for all motorhomes in France. Source: Coyote Secure, Observatoire 2026

The broader statistics from France Assureurs and Argos show a different overall picture for 2025: across all vehicle types, 64,088 insured vehicles were reported stolen. That was nine percent fewer than in 2024. The French Ministry of the Interior also recorded an overall decline in vehicle theft.

These statements do not necessarily contradict each other. The Coyote analysis concerns a limited, technically monitored vehicle population and highlights vans and motorhomes separately. France Assureurs, by contrast, covers almost the entire French insurance market and all vehicle categories. No publicly available representative annual statistic exists solely for motorhomes.

The responsible conclusion is therefore not that motorhome thefts across France have demonstrably risen by 30 percent. What is documented is that leisure vehicles in Coyote's monitored fleet were more affected and that professional thieves increasingly use electronic methods, organised division of labour and cross-border resale channels.

The key figures at a glance

• 64,088 insured vehicles were reported stolen in France in 2025.
• That represents a nine percent decline compared with 2024.
• In around 70 percent of the cases evaluated by France Assureurs, there were no visible signs of forced entry.
• Fiat Ducato III, Peugeot Boxer III and Citroën Jumper III ranked first, second and third in 2025 for theft frequency among commercial vehicles.
• Coyote Secure reported a 30 percent higher theft risk for vans and camping-cars within its own monitored fleet.
• A network uncovered by the French Gendarmerie involved 151 stolen motorhomes whose identities had been altered.

The figures for Ducato, Boxer and Jumper relate to commercial vehicles and not exclusively to motorhomes. They are nevertheless relevant for motorhome owners because a significant proportion of European motorhomes and panel vans are built on precisely these base vehicles. Source: France Assureurs and Argos, Palmarès 2025

Which base vehicles are particularly affected?

In addition to the passenger-car ranking, France Assureurs publishes a list of commercial vehicles with the highest theft frequency. It includes models under ten years old with at least 2,000 registered vehicles and at least 100 reported thefts in the year concerned.

1. Fiat Ducato
2. Peugeot Boxer
3. Citroën Jumper
4. Iveco Daily
5. Renault Master

This result is noteworthy for the motorhome sector. The top three models are closely related technically and form the basis of numerous motorhomes and panel vans.

It does not follow that every Ducato-based motorhome is at acute risk. The statistics do show, however, that these platforms are economically interesting to thieves. There are several plausible reasons:

• The vehicles are widespread and easy for thieves to identify.
• Knowledge of doors, locking systems and electronics can be applied to many vehicles.
• Spare parts and complete base vehicles are in strong demand.
• The base vehicle, conversion and technical equipment each have significant resale value.
• Stolen vehicles can be re-identified, dismantled or resold in other countries.

What professional thieves do with stolen motorhomes

A major investigation by the French Gendarmerie shows that theft is often only the first stage of a longer value chain.

According to the Gendarmerie, an organised network allegedly “laundered” 151 stolen motorhomes and 289 other vehicles between 2022 and 2023. Vehicle identities and entries in the French registration system were manipulated, allowing the vehicles to be registered again and resold.

The estimated loss involving the motorhomes was around €8.4 million. During a nationwide operation, 58 stolen and manipulated motorhomes were recovered. Source: Gendarmerie nationale

The case shows why high-value motorhomes are attractive to organised criminals. A vehicle can be:

• registered again under another identity,
• sold complete abroad,
• used as a source of parts,
• combined with documents or identity features from another vehicle,
• passed on through specialised resale channels.

How does a professional motorhome theft typically unfold?

Not every theft follows the same pattern. Nevertheless, a typical sequence of attack can be described without turning it into a technical instruction manual.

Stage 1: selecting a suitable vehicle

In an opportunistic theft, circumstances determine the target. Professional thieves, by contrast, may observe and assess a vehicle beforehand. Relevant factors include model and approximate age, vehicle value, how long it remains parked, visible security measures, cameras, pedestrian traffic and the possibility of a quick getaway.

A motorhome parked briefly in a busy location presents a different situation from a high-value vehicle left unmoved in the same place for several days. The longer a vehicle can be observed, the better thieves can prepare for existing security measures.

Stage 2: gaining access to the interior

Before a vehicle can be started and driven away, thieves generally need access to the interior. Towing or loading the vehicle is also possible, but is more logistically demanding, more conspicuous and not practical at every location.

For Fiat Ducato, Peugeot Boxer and Citroën Jumper, a known weak point around the driver's door is relevant. In the so-called prick attack, this area is deliberately manipulated in order to trigger the central locking system.

The method is attractive to thieves because it can be quick, comparatively quiet and possible without extensive destruction.

This is exactly the first stage addressed by the PrickStop protective plate for the driver's door. It reinforces the known area and makes quick access to the weak point more difficult.

That does not make the vehicle impenetrable. Thieves could still try to attack the lock cylinder by force, break a window, switch to another door or continue with heavier tools.

The key difference is the extra effort. A short, quiet manipulation can become a longer, louder and much more conspicuous attack. In a publicly visible parking area, that loss of time may be enough to make the thief abandon the attempt.

Stage 3: defeating the electronic immobiliser

Once the vehicle is open, it still has to be started. It would be too simplistic to describe every modern vehicle theft merely as an “OBD theft”.

Depending on the vehicle and attack system, the OBD diagnostic port can play an important role. Other possibilities include attacks on vehicle communications, the CAN bus or individual electronic components.

Professional thieves can in principle attempt to:

• misuse diagnostic functions,
• electronically generate valid start authorisation,
• program or emulate a key,
• manipulate vehicle communications or control units,
• interfere with the electronic system via the CAN bus.

France Assureurs notes that prepared electronic attacks can take place very quickly. The time required, however, depends heavily on the vehicle model, security system, equipment and the thieves' approach.

The French Gendarmerie has repeatedly pursued groups using electronic methods. In one Bordeaux investigation, vehicles were stolen by so-called mouse-jacking, meaning manipulation of electronic vehicle systems. Source: Gendarmerie nationale

A mechanical OBD lock can make direct access to the diagnostic port more difficult. It does not automatically protect against every electronic attack method, however, because depending on the vehicle thieves may use other access points.

The factory electronic immobiliser remains useful, but on a high-value motorhome it should not be regarded as the only layer of protection.

Stage 4: mechanical immobilisers become an unexpected obstacle

Once thieves have overcome the doors and electronics, they expect to be able to start and move the vehicle quickly. This is precisely where a substantial mechanical immobiliser can become particularly inconvenient.

The PrickStop pedal lock for Fiat Ducato, Peugeot Boxer and Citroën Jumper from 2006 is made from solid eight-millimetre steel and blocks operation of the pedals. It works completely independently of the immobiliser, OBD interface and vehicle electronics.

Its role within the attack chain:

• It cannot be disabled electronically.
• Thieves often see it only after the vehicle has been opened.
• It prevents or obstructs normal pedal operation.
• Forcible removal requires time and suitable tools.
• Sawing, cutting or deforming solid steel creates considerable noise.

No mechanical immobiliser is fundamentally impossible to overcome. With enough time, heavy tools and sufficient preparation, solid steel can also be attacked.

For practical purposes, however, a different question is decisive: did the thief expect this additional obstacle?

In a public parking area, an unexpected pedal lock can turn a planned quick vehicle theft into a long, noisy and risky operation.

The most effective approach is not one supposedly “unbreakable” device but a chain of independent obstacles:

1. The known prick attack does not work as expected because of the protective plate.
2. The thief has to choose a louder or slower access method.
3. The factory electronics or immobiliser must be defeated.
4. A substantial pedal lock becomes visible once inside the vehicle.
5. Additional door locks, an alarm, OBD protection or a steering-wheel lock may also be present.

Each individual measure can theoretically be overcome. Together, however, they increase time, tool requirements, noise and the risk of discovery.

Stage 5: additional locks prevent easy access

Mechanical additional locks on the cab doors work independently of the central locking system. Even if the factory locking system has been defeated electronically or mechanically, a separately locked additional lock remains closed.

The thief must then attack the additional lock as well, choose another door, break a window or abandon the attempt.

An additional lock and a protective plate perform different tasks. The plate protects a known structural weak point. The additional lock creates a further barrier independent of the factory locking system.

Stage 6: searching for trackers or disrupting tracking

A GPS tracker does not normally prevent the theft. Its purpose is to report movement early and support recovery.

Professional thieves, however, expect high-value vehicles to be trackable. They may search common installation locations, disconnect power, move vehicles into buildings, underground garages or containers, interfere with radio communications or remove tracking devices after the first journey.

A technically sensible tracker should therefore:

• be installed out of sight,
• not be placed in an obvious standard location,
• have its own backup power supply,
• report movement and departure from a defined area immediately,
• not depend solely on the starter battery.

For particularly valuable motorhomes, a second technically independent tracking layer can make sense. A more easily discovered device may occupy the thief's attention while a second system continues operating. This combination also offers no guarantee against professional radio jamming, but it again increases the effort required.

Which security measure works against which attack?

Are steering-wheel locks useful?

Simple steering-wheel locks are often not an especially high barrier for prepared thieves. Depending on the design, the steering wheel itself may be attacked rather than the lock.

Nevertheless, a steering-wheel lock can be useful within a layered security concept:

• It is visible from outside.
• It signals additional mechanical effort.
• It creates another work step.
• Combined with door protection and a pedal lock, it increases the time required.

A simple steering-wheel lock should not be relied upon as the sole protection for a high-value motorhome. As an additional measure within several independent layers, however, it can still be useful.

What role do gear-lever locks play?

A permanently installed gear-lever lock, such as those offered by Bear-Lock, blocks the gear mechanism in a defined position depending on the vehicle. This can make it difficult or impossible to select neutral or another gear.

It provides another mechanical obstacle against an attempt to drive the vehicle away. A blocked gear mechanism can also make manoeuvring or loading more difficult.

On a vehicle with a manual clutch, however, it remains possible in principle for the vehicle to roll with the clutch depressed. A gear-lever lock therefore provides stronger protection in combination with a pedal lock than as a stand-alone measure.

Where is the risk higher in France?

No robust publicly available regional statistic exists solely for motorhomes. Many datasets combine passenger cars, commercial vehicles and motorhomes. Their usefulness for travellers is therefore limited because motorhomes are frequently parked at tourist destinations, motorhome stopovers, campsites or along typical travel routes and thus have a different usage profile from ordinary cars.

General vehicle statistics can indicate regional concentrations but do not reliably show which motorhome route or holiday region is actually safer or more dangerous.

For a practical assessment, specific factors are usually more relevant:

• How long is the vehicle left unattended?
• Can someone work on doors, the front of the vehicle or electronics out of sight?
• Is there quick access to a motorway, border or port?
• Is the vehicle new, valuable and easy to resell?
• Are mechanical security devices visible or permanently installed?
• How much time would thieves need to overcome several layers of security?

The security measures used should suit the particular situation. Parking duration, surroundings, visual concealment, escape routes and vehicle value all influence the risk. The aim is not necessarily to fit every lock at every short stop, but to combine several independent protection layers when the risk is elevated.

What conclusion can be drawn from the French data?

The figures currently being circulated need to be distinguished carefully:

• France Assureurs and Argos: the number of insured vehicle thefts across all categories fell by nine percent in 2025.
• Coyote Secure: within its own monitored fleet, the observed risk for vans and camping-cars rose by 30 percent.
• Official overall motorhome statistics: no representative nationwide figure solely for motorhomes is publicly available.
• Base vehicles: Fiat Ducato, Peugeot Boxer and Citroën Jumper lead the French commercial-vehicle theft ranking.
• Offender structure: investigations document organised networks, electronic attacks, manipulated vehicle identities and cross-border resale.

France should therefore not be described generally as an unsafe country for motorhome travel. The data do show, however, that high-value leisure vehicles are economically attractive targets and that professional thieves can operate with considerable technical and organisational preparation.

A sensible security strategy should therefore address several stages of an attack:

1. make quick access via known door weak points more difficult,
2. supplement factory locking with independent mechanical locks,
3. make access to the diagnostic interface more difficult,
4. mechanically prevent driving away after an electronic attack,
5. make the attack riskier through alarms and visible locks,
6. provide concealed and as far as possible independent tracking.

A protective plate for the known driver's-door weak point makes quick entry more difficult. A substantial pedal lock made from eight-millimetre steel remains effective even if the vehicle electronics have already been defeated.

The goal is not one single unbeatable security device. The thief should encounter several independent obstacles one after another until the time, noise, tools and risk of discovery exceed the expected reward.

Sources and further information

• France Assureurs: ranking of vehicles stolen in 2025
• France Assureurs and Argos: full presentation of the 2025 ranking
• Coyote Secure: Observatoire des vols et de la récupération après-vol 2026
• Gendarmerie nationale: network re-identifying stolen motorhomes
• Gendarmerie nationale: vehicle theft by mouse-jacking
• French Ministry of the Interior: crime trends in 2025